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Abstract
The ﬁnancial turmoil that began in mid-2007 produced severe stress in interbank markets
and prompted signiﬁcant changes in central banks’ funding operations. We examine the
changing characteristics of ECB oﬃcial interventions through the crisis and assess how they
aﬀected the eﬃciency and reliability of the secondary repo market as a mechanism for the
distribution of interbank funding. The limit orderbook from the BrokerTec electronic repo
trading platform is reconstructed to provide a range of indicators of participating banks’
aversion to the risk of failing to fund their liquidity needs. These indicators anticipate
similar variables from ECB reverse repo auctions and are also aﬀected by surprise outcomes
of auctions.
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The recent ﬁnancial crisis began in the interbank markets where counterparty risk rose to unprece-
dented levels and banks responded by withdrawing from unsecured lending and by increasing their
hoarding of liquidity. The contraction in interbank market liquidity necessitated Central banks
(including the ECB) stepping-in as “liquidity provider of last resort” in order to prevent systemic
failure. Short term liquidity needs of banks have traditionally been supplied through three diﬀerent
avenues that can be considered imperfect substitutes for each other. These include (i), unsecured
interbank borrowing, (ii) interbank borrowing by repo (or secured borrowing) and (iii), borrowing
from oﬃcial sources by bidding in monetary policy operations. It is well documented by, for exam-
ple, Brunetti, di Filippo and Harris (2009), that unsecured interbank markets were badly aﬀected by
the crisis. However, it is less clear what happened to the interbank repo market where counterparty
risk is not as likely to be a signiﬁcant direct determinant of activity. Also, repo markets are more
directly linked with oﬃcial monetary operations because these are conducted using collateral. In this
paper we analyze the eﬀects of changes to the structure of monetary policy operations on interbank
repo market liquidity provision and vice versa. We construct indicators of the level of funding risk
aversion (speciﬁcally, aversion to the risk of being unable to fund banking activity because of lack
of access to interbank funding). These variables are based on microstructure data observable in
the electronic trading platforms of one of the main interbank repo markets in Europe. These mea-
sures are shown to predict similar variables associated with bidding behaviour in oﬃcial monetary
policy operations. We apply a modiﬁed form of Granger causality testing to ascertain how policy
responded to surprise stresses in the repo market and we examine whether oﬃcial policy responses
helped to improve secondary repo market conditions. The evidence indicates two way causality and
we highlight the fact that operations were probably too cautious to have remedied liquidity stresses
in the period preceding the introduction of ﬁxed rate full allotment auctions.1 
 
1. Introduction 
The ECB reacted to the financial turmoil of 2007-2009 with unprecedented policies aimed at 
ensuring  that  solvent  banks  could  continue  to  satisfy  their  liquidity  requirements  when 
interbank  sources  contracted.    How  exactly  did  events  in  the  interbank  market  affect  the 
conduct of official operations, and did anticipated changes in official interventions have spill-
over  effects  to  liquidity  provision  in secondary  interbank  repo  markets?   We  address  these 
issues through a detailed analysis of ECB interventions and by an analysis of the microstructure 
of the electronic secondary repo market in the euro-area throughout the financial turmoil.  The 
analysis shows that crisis-related liquidity shocks had a significant effect on the functioning of 
the secondary repo market both in anticipation of policy initiatives and in reaction to policy 
surprises.
1   
An important feature of the secondary repo market is the fact that many of the participants also 
have privileged access to ECB official operations.  This means that official operations are 
potentially a direct substitute for interbank activity.   It is clear that the rate obtained in official 
operations (or the expected rate) directly affects the rate that banks are willing to pay or accept 
in the secondary market.  Indeed, affecting interest rates in the interbank market is precisely the 
objective of such operations.  However, in the context of a liquidity crisis, anticipated provision 
of liquidity in official operations and the uncertainty surrounding such interventions  is likely to 
have had profound effects  not just  on the rate available in the secondary m arket but, more 
importantly, on the amount of liquidity provided and obtained there.   
The  ECB’s  Financial  Stability  Review  (2009)  makes  an  important  distinction  between  the 
market’s ability to redistribute liquidity across banks experiencing idiosyncratic shocks and how 
the  market  copes  with  sudden,  large,  aggregate  liquidity  shocks.    Official  interventions  are 
designed to cope with the dislocations produced by common shocks and the secondary market 
normally  copes  well  with  the  redistribution  necessary  to  deal  with  idiosyncratic  shocks.    In 
normal  circumstances  it  is  relatively  easy  to  predict  aggregate  liquidity  demand  and  satisfy 
aggregate  imbalances  through  official  operations.    But  during  the  recent  crisis  (and  until  a 
decision  was  taken  to  over-supply  liquidity  at  a  fixed  rate)  there  were  larger  than  normal 
aggregate liquidity shocks and larger than normal policy actions that were conducted under 
increased uncertainty  about general liquidity  conditions.   It  is  therefore  possible  that some 
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official  operations  contributed  to  substantial  aggregate  shocks  and  to  the  general  level  of 
liquidity uncertainty.  This most likely affected the behavior of participants in official operations 
as well as their behavior in the secondary repo market.  This study examines the evidence of 
such effects using high frequency secondary market data. 
The ECB has been aware of the potential impact of its unusual operations on the secondary 
market but to our knowledge most of these effects have not been explored in detail.  In a 
speech  by  a  member  of  the  executive  board  of  the  ECB,  José  Manuel  González-Páramo  in 
Madrid on 16
th Jan 2009, it was stated that, 
“…as long as money markets remain dysfunctional, it is crucial for the Eurosystem to 
continue  to  provide  as  much  liquidity  as  needed  in  order  to  ease  tensions  in  the 
impaired money markets, with a view to ensuring that access to liquidity of solvent 
banks  is  not  disrupted,  thereby  also  contributing  to  safeguarding  financial  stability.  
However, this is not the ideal long term solution in a market oriented economy like the 
euro area.  It may discourage the resumption of normal interbank trading activity.  It 
also potentially implies increased financial risks for the Eurosystem.” 
While it is clear that the increasing substitutability of official sources of liquidity for interbank 
sources is an important determinant of the microstructural characteristics of the secondary repo 
market  during  the  crisis,  some  of  these  effects  could  have  improved  rather  than  reduced 
liquidity in the secondary repo market.  This follows because some participants in the secondary 
market do not have access to ECB operations.  It is possible that during the crisis the secondary 
repo market became more important than usual as a redistributive mechanism.  Also, since the 
unsecured interbank market was badly affected by counterparty risk there may have been a 
substitution effect that favoured increased liquidity of the repo market.  
Evidence  (but  not causal  attribution)  has  been  provided  of  the  virtual  collapse  of  the  repo 
market at the most severe moments of the recent crisis.  Hördahl and King (2008) found that, as 
the  financial  market  turmoil  intensified  throughout  2008,  repo  transactions  (i)  became 
restricted to shorter maturities (ii) involved higher quality collateral and (iii), in the case of 
general collateral repos, were done at reduced spreads relative to overnight index swap (OIS) 
rates.    These  changes  may  have  reflected  concerns  about  the  credit  worthiness  of 
counterparties,  the  increasing  demand  for  liquid  assets  and  the  hoarding  of  high  quality 
collateral.  Supply and demand factors are suggested to be linked to the behavior of money 3 
 
market funds that increasingly retained their liquid assets and to the behavior of longer-term 
investment funds that were increasingly reluctant to lend out high quality assets.   
While counterparty risk has been identified in the existing literature as a causal factor in the 
crisis it is difficult to see how this could have been a direct cause of significant changes to the 
microstructure of the repo market.  In the case of the secondary repo market, most European 
repo  contracts  are cleared through  LCH  Clearnet  Ltd  which  assumes  the counterparty  risk.
2  
However, it is plausible to suggest that causality may have run indirectly.  When the unsecured 
interbank  market  collapsed,  expectations  of  more  favorable  (perhaps  less  risky)  and  more 
generous official supply of liquidity may have constrained supply of liquidity from banks to each 
other in the secured lending market.  Our analysis throws some light on this potential chain of 
causality.   
There  is  direct evidence from  the  analysis  of official auctions  that participating  banks  were 
willing to bid aggressively in excess of the policy target rate at pivotal times during the crisis to 
ensure  that  they  obtained  sufficient  liquidity.  This  begs  the  questions;  did  bidding 
aggressiveness in official operations simply reflect aggressive seeking of yield for funds, and 
unusual imbalance in liquidity provision in the secondary repo market, or did anticipated supply 
of  liquidity  in  official  operations  help  to  cause  contraction  of  supply  and  demand  in  the 
secondary repo market?  If the anticipated supply at favorable rates (with zero counterparty 
risk) caused agents  not to  participate  in  the  secondary  market  in  advance  of auctions,  this 
provides a self fulfilling outcome from the policy action and it is important to quantify these 
effects  so  that  future  interventions  can  be  improved.    The  last  phase  of  the  crisis  was 
characterized by fixed-rate full-allotment auctions and in this regime there is little doubt that 
that  anticipated  over-supply  drove  out  interbank  intermediation  but  earlier  attempts  at 
satisfying  demand  may  also  have  produced  anticipation  effects.  While  it  is  clear  that 
unanticipated outcomes from official auctions could be disruptive for the secondary market (as 
described in Brunetti, Filippo and Harris 2009 for the case of the unsecured interbank market), it 
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ATS trades are registered with RepoClear when they are agreed on the screen and on receipt and confirmation 
of ‘eligible transactions’ the counterparty risk is assumed by LCH Clearnet.  Eligibility mostly concerns the 
checking of whether the counterparty is a member of the Clearnet counterparty list.  All countries considered 
in our analysis except Greece are covered in this way.  In the case of Greek data we only consider the special 
contract and it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of counterparty risk and specialness. 4 
 
is also possible that anticipated over-provision of liquidity in official operations could cause pre-
emptive  contraction  in  liquidity  provision  in  secondary  markets  and  this  deserves  further 
analysis by direct examination of secondary market data.   
Our analysis concerns the relationship between indicators of funding liquidity risk aversion in 
official operations and the equivalent measures from the secondary repo market.  We examine 
a pre-crisis period for comparative purposes.  We then examine two different phases of the 
crisis  in  order  to  distinguish  between  periods  that  were  characterized  by  normal  auction 
procedures and a phase when there was no uncertainty about the rate that would prevail in 
auctions, but in which the quantity allotted remained highly uncertain (i.e., in the case of ‘fixed-
rate full-allotment’ auctions).   
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2010) use the aggressiveness of bidding behaviour of banks in Main 
Refinancing Operations (MROs) as an indication of their “funding liquidity risk aversion”.  This 
provides  us  with  a  useful  indicator  of  secured  interbank  market  stress  related  to  the 
aggressiveness of banks’ bidding behavior in official operations.  The deviation between the 
intended policy target rate and the weighted average rate obtained by participants in official 
operations is indicative of variation in liquidity needs not satisfied in the interbank market.
3  
However, in the last phase of the crisis (with full -allotment auctions) the  Drehmann and 
Nikolaou indicator is not available.  This does not rule out the use of other indicators of liquidity 
risk aversion from auction results (such as surprises in the amounts bid in auctions   or the 
number of bidders) but we leave this for future work.  Our heuristic examination of the data for 
the period of full-allotment auctions does however indicate reduced interbank market stress 
and excessive supply of liquidity in official interventions relative to what is traded among the 
banks. 
Our analysis follows in the same vein as a number of studies concerned with repo operations of 
the ECB.  In Nyborg et al. (2002) weekly repo auctions of the ECB are examined to gain an 
understanding of how bidding strategies affect the outcomes.  Eis enschmidt et al (2009) 
examine bidding behavior in ECB funding operations during the crisis and find that it was 
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behaviour they regard the gap between the target rate and the weighted average rate obtained in auctions as 
a good substitute for ‘funding liquidity risk aversion’.  This has the advantage of being publicly available soon 
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affected  by  the  increased  individual  refinancing  motive,  the  increased  attractiveness  of  the 
ECB’s tender operations due to its collateral framework and banks’ bidding more aggressively, 
i.e. at higher rates, to avoid being rationed at the marginal rate in times of increased liquidity 
uncertainty.  
Section  2  discusses  the  context  within  which  our  analysis  is  conducted.    We  outline  how 
counterparty risk manifested itself during the crisis and we identify periods when the secondary 
repo  market  was  affected  by  counterparty  risk  despite  the  collateralized  nature  of  such 
transactions.  We then discuss the policy reaction in terms of interest rate setting and regular 
(as well as irregular) refinancing operations.  Our analysis of the refinancing operations reveal 
that  at  pivotal  times  during  the  crisis  the  ECB’s  refinancing  target  rate  was  often  greatly 
exceeded  and  that  the  percentage  of  auction  participants  who  obtained  the  marginal  rate 
declined  markedly.    Also,  the  number  of  bidders  participating  in  auctions,  the  unsatisfied 
demand in such auctions and the rates obtained by some participants, provides insights about 
how effectively ECB operations helped to counter dysfunction of the interbank market due to 
the  counterparty  risk  problem.    In  Section  3  the  main  characteristics  of  the  secondary 
(interbank) repo market in Europe are described.  This is based on information from SIFMA 
surveys  of  market  participants  which  gives  an  indication  of  the  size  of  the  secondary  repo 
market (including OTC trading) and the proportion that is traded electronically.  We describe in 
detail the BrokerTec electronic market for European repos. With this general background we 
proceed to a more detailed analysis of the microstructure characteristics of the BrokerTec repo 
market data during the crisis around policy events. 
Section 4 addresses the econometric methodology we employ to identify the spill-over effects 
of the crisis and the effects of policy interventions on the secondary repo market.  We adapt the 
basic approach of Andersen et al. (2002) to suit both anticipation of outcomes and reaction to 
policy events.  This has direct parallels with recent research on the unsecured interbank market 
stress during the crisis.  In Brunetti, Filippo and Harris (2009) the effect of official interventions 
on the unsecured, electronic, interbank lending market is analyzed.  They conclude that large 
ECB policy initiatives during the crisis increased the level of uncertainty in the interbank market 
and crowded out private provision of liquidity.  We analyze the post auction effects on liquidity 
in  the  secondary  repo  market  but  our  analysis  also  considers  the  pre-auction  effects  of 
anticipated liquidity provision from official operations.  Despite the relatively small number of 
events analysed, the richness of our dataset affords us the opportunity to obtain estimates of 6 
 
the  effects  of  anticipated  policy  actions.  The  results  and  interpretation  of  the  results  is 
contained in Section 5. 
 
2. Funding Operations and Counterparty Risk 
The ECB operates through secured lending operations with direct participation from banking 
institutions all over Europe.  This broad participation is helpful in terms of securing liquidity 
distribution (and short term funding supply) across a large number of banking institutions and 
stands in contrast to the narrower participation by banks in Federal Reserve operations in the 
US.
4  The only impediment to access to ECB funding is capital adequacy and the availability of 
adequate  collateral  to  take  advantage  of  refinancing  op erations.    However,  a  potentially 
negative consequence of this structure is the risk that ECB activity would  more easily swamp 
normal  interbank  market  activity  (both through anticipated generous supply and following 
surprises in supply).  On the other hand, since unsecured funding markets suffered more acutely 
from elevated counterparty risk  during the crisis, this may have favored increased secondary 
repo market  activity.    But the specific effects of  the crisis and of the significant changes in 
official interventions on secondary repo activity remain largely unknown. 
The effects of policy events in the European context  can be considered in three phases.  The 
pre-crisis phase (in our sample this runs from 2
nd Jan 2006 to 8
th Aug 2007) is characterized by 
normal repo  operations and  an  upward  trend  in  interest  rates.    In  this phase  there  are 19 
reserve maintenance periods and 19 ECB interest rate decision dates.  On 7 of these dates 
interest rates were raised.  On the remaining 12 occasions interest rates were left unchanged. 
The second phase (8
th Aug 2007 – 2
nd Oct 2008) is the first crisis phase and this was mostly 
characterized by stable, but relatively high official rates.  There are 14 maintenance periods and 
therefore 14 ECB interest rate decision dates in this phase.  There was only one interest rate 
change, which was positive.  This phase includes the Lehman collapse which produced extreme 
volatility and interbank market stress.  The last phase (3
rd Oct 2008 – 31
st Mar 2009) begins just 
before  the  “General  Announcement  on  Liquidity  Policy”  by  the  ECB  on  8
th  Oct  2008  which 
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directly, it might also be concluded that an additional distributive mechanism such as the secondary repo 
market is less necessary than in the US where only primary dealers have access to the official repo lending 
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introduced  the  ‘fixed-rate’  ‘full-allotment’  auction  policy.    This  phase  is  characterized  by 
declining rates with 6 reductions in the reference interest rate out of a possible 7 decision dates. 
The two phases covering the crisis involve two different approaches by the ECB to mitigate the 
effects of the financial turmoil.  In the first crisis phase the ECB modified its funding procedures 
by  (1)  adjusting  the  distribution  of  liquidity  over  the  reserve  maintenance  period  by 
systematically allotting liquidity in excess of the theoretical ‘benchmark allotment’ (front-loaded 
near  the  early  part  of  the  maintenance  period)  while  still  aiming  for  balanced  liquidity 
conditions  at  the  end  of  the  maintenance  periods  (we  note  below  that  while  there  was 
increased supply there was also increased excess demand), (2) extending the average maturity 
of its financing, and (3), engaging with other central banks to relieve liquidity shortages of the 
euro-area banks in other currencies (mostly US dollars as part of the TAF operations).  In the 
second crisis phase, in addition to aggressive reductions in the targeted refinancing rate, the 
ECB  (1),  introduced  a  fixed  rate  tender  procedure  with  full  allotment  in  both  the  main 
refinancing operations and the long-term refinancing operations, (2) increased the number of 
longer  term  operations,
5 (3) increased the range of assets eligible for   use as collateral in 
Eurosystem credit operations
6 and (4) increased US dollar swap financing by use of fixed -rate 
tenders with full allotment by special arrangements with the Federal Reserve System.  On 7
th 
May 2009 the ECB also announced that it would begin operations to buy EUR 60 billion of 
covered  bonds  and  that  the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  would  become  an  eligible 
counterparty in Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations on 8
th July 2009.  Some effort was 
made  (effective  21
st  Jan  2009)  to  encourage  banks  to  re-engage  with  each  other  in  the 
unsecured interbank market by re-widening the corridor between rates for standing facilities to 
200 basis points around the rate on main refinancing operations (the 100 bps corridor had been 
introduced in Oct 9
th 2007).   
The fixed rate full-allotment policy of the ECB was announced on 8
th Oct 2008 and came into 
effect on 15
th Oct 2008 and it placed a virtual cap on the secondary market repo rate.  In normal 
circumstances the ECB tries to ensure that banks have access to short term liquidity facilities 
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purely to avoid unanticipated, temporary shortfalls in their requirements.  Under such normal 
circumstances ECB funding was rationed in a competitive setting, and the repo rate was driven 
to a level that would be of only marginal benefit to banks facing unexpected liquidity shortages.  
Figure [1] shows that the introduction of fixed-rate full allotment auctions appears to have 
driven yields in the secondary market below the ECB policy target rate. 
In  the  euro-area,  refinancing operations of the  ECB  in  the  pre-turbulence  period were  very 
stable with around 300 billion EUR outstanding in weekly refinancing of liquidity provision on an 
on-going basis.  The supply in MRO auctions was roughly equal to what was maturing from the 
previous week’s operation.  Likewise, in the pre-turbulence period, Longer Term Operations 
were stable and usually involved outstanding repo lending by the ECB of about 100 billion EUR 
(also planned to replace maturing operations).  Significant changes occurred in the last quarter 
of 2008 reflecting the ECBs efforts to relieve tensions in the short term refinancing markets 
through increased volume and terms of their operations.  MROs declined to achieve about 150 
million  EUR outstanding  and  this  facilitated  an  increase  in  the  supplementary  longer  terms 
operations.  SLTROs were of increasingly longer duration and new supply in these operations 
was more than replacing what was maturing from previous operations.  In the second phase of 
the crisis (associated with fixed-rate, full-allotment auctions) the outstanding issued amount 
from SLTROs increased markedly and this was not related to reduction in either standard LTROs 
or MROs.  At its peak, the outstanding financing (including operations of weekly duration and 
longer  term  and  special  supplementary  operations)  amounted  to  roughly  900  billion  EUR.  
Figure [2] shows the outstanding funding associated with LTRO and Supplementary LTROs over 
the sample period. 
The  SLTROs  were  deliberately  targeted  at  relieving  the  need  for  banks  to  provide  both 
unsecured and secured funding to each other.  There is a large difference between how this was 
done in the two phases of the crisis.  In the first phase of the crisis the policy rate (which was 
normally consistent with the marginal yield settled at auctions) became less indicative of yields 
settled  for  average  bidders.    The  method  for  allocating  supply  was  still  on  the  basis  of 
discriminatory  auctions  and  since  demand  was  greater  than  usual,  and  bidding  was  more 
aggressive, the settlement rate diverged from the policy rate.  More risk-averse bidders were 
often allocated supply at rates that significantly exceeded the policy rate.  
From 2
nd Jan 2006 to 31
st Mar 2009 there were 168 main refinancing operations (MROs), 38 
normal  long  term  refinancing  operations  (LTROs),  55  fine-tuning  operations  (OTs)  and  26 9 
 
supplementary  (crisis-related)  long-term  refinancing  operations  (SLTROs).  The  first  of  the 
supplementary operations took place on Friday 24
th August 2007.  The breakdown of operations 
by type and phase is shown in Table [1].  Before we relate surprises from policy variables to repo 
market microstructure it is important to have a clear understanding of trends and structural 
breaks that are directly apparent from an examination of the time series of outcomes from the 
auctions.  We now discuss a number of relevant post-auction variables with this intention.  We 
begin with the number of bidders in auctions which is displayed in Figure [3] for the case of 
MROs.  The number of bidders rises dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman 
collapse when counterparty risk was most acute.  At its height the number of bidders was twice 
its normal level.  We found the same pattern in other types of operations.  In pre-crisis LTROs 
the number of bidders was around 175 and at the height of the crisis this rose to 250.  There 
were slightly fewer participants in the SLTROs that began in the first phase of the crisis but this 
also rose to about 225 at the height of the crisis.   
Most of the SLTROs had a maturity of 3 months however there were 8 that had a maturity of six 
months.  Thus the increased supply of this longer-term maturity would have reduced the need 
for a normal supply at the weekly MROs.  In the announcement that accompanied the first 
supplementary  auction  it  was  stated  that  “the  allotment  amounts  in  the  main  refinancing 
operations will offset this provision of liquidity, taking into consideration the overall liquidity 
conditions.”  There was some reduction in amounts issued in MROs but Figure [4] shows that 
taking into account the longer average duration of the supplementary operations, outstanding 
issuance rose significantly (in the full-allotment period it obviously increased to match liquidity 
demanded).   
It is  difficult to  assess  whether  the  amounts supplied  was  in  fact sufficient unless  one  also 
considers amounts demanded.  Figure [5] shows demand and supply in each of the four main 
types of operations together.  It should be noted that the supply and demand are equal in most 
of  the  last  phase  since  this  was  the  period  of  the  fixed-rate  full-allotment  auctions  where 
demand was completely satisfied.  This led to a significant jump in the actual supply.  When 
supply and demand are not equated we see that demand virtually always outstrips supply.  It is 
useful to know that this was also the norm in the pre-crisis period.  
The most revealing information from auctions can be obtained by examining the marginal rate 
and weighted average rate obtained at auctions.  The difference between these rates reflects 
the level of aversion to liquidity shortfall by participating banks. Before the introduction of fixed 10 
 
rate  full  allotment  on  8
th  October  2008  auctions  were  settled  at  discriminating  rates.  
Participants more desperate to ensure allocation at auctions bid at higher rates than the best 
rate  obtained  (this  is  described  in  Drehmann  and  Nikolaou,  2010).    This  frustrated  the 
attainment  of  the  desired  refinancing  rate  announced  at  ECB  interest  rate  meetings  (a 
significant mechanism by which ECB policy is achieved).  In Figures [6] and [7] we consider the 
two ways in which auction rates relate to the target rate.  In Figure [6] we show the difference 
between the Marginal Rate attained in MRO auctions as a deviation from the most recently 
announced refinancing rate.  We label this the Target Gap.  The gap widens at points of acute 
stress during the crisis (we include the EONIA-OIS spread in Figure [6] to make this clear).  It 
seems that as participants were increasingly desperate to ensure supply at auctions they bid for 
more supply than the ECB was prepared to supply at rates that exceeded the target rate and this 
forced settlement at a marginal rate that was sometimes significantly above the official target.   
Thus we have two outcomes from the auction that matter for liquidity.  One is the fact that 
quantity was constrained relative to what would have satisfied demand at the official target rate 
and the other is the fact that the price of liquidity (i.e., the rate) exceeded what was intended.  
The second effect was actually more serious than is revealed by the deviation between the 
target  rate  and  the  marginal  rate  obtained.    Figure  [7]  shows  the  weighted  average  rate 
obtained  in  MROs  auctions  in  excess  of  the  marginal  rate  obtained  (as  just  described,  the 
marginal  rate  itself  deviated  from  the  target  rate  at  points  of  stress).  We  call  the  spread 
between the marginal rate and the weighted average rate the AWAYRATE.  We include in Figure 
[7] the EONIA-OIS spread which was shown earlier and represents the degree of counterparty 
risk associated with unsecured interbank lending.  The AWAYRATE has a high correlation with 
the EONIA-OIS spread.  The fact that there was both unsatisfied demand and a higher rate than 
officially desired in auctions in this period, implies that official funding operations may have 
contributed to liquidity stress.  For now, we are content to conclude that the two series are 
simply contemporaneously correlated and we do not infer the direction of causality.  However, 
on  the  basis of the  target  gap,  ECB operations do  not appear overly  generous  in  satisfying 
liquidity needs.  According to Drehmann and Nikolaou this gap simply reflects the increased risk 
aversion to ‘funding liquidity risk’ on behalf of auction participants. The foregoing analysis of 
ECB operations provides an important backdrop to our analysis below. 
 
Repo rates and counterparty risk?  11 
 
It is widely believed that the recent financial market crisis had most of its effects in the form of 
elevated counterparty risk and stress in the unsecured interbank lending markets.  This has 
often  been  described  using  the  LIBOR-OIS  spread  (in  the  European  context  the  EONIA-OIS 
spread).
7   The  EONIA-Eurepo  spread should be a good alternative to the EONIA -OIS spread 
because  the  repo  market  involves  secured  lending  and  it  is  therefore  largely  free  of  
counterparty risk.  Figure [8] shows the EONIA-Eurepo spread during the period we study along 
with the EONIA-OIS spread.  It is clear from this that repo rates moved almost in step with swap 
rates and this would seem to confirm that the repo market did not suffer significantly from the 
effects of elevated counterparty risk during the crisis.  However, there were periods in which 
even  the  repo  rate  seemed  to  reflect  the  effects  of  changes  in  counterparty  risk  (or 
alternatively, the effects of the hoarding of high quality collateral).   
Figure [9] shows the difference between the Eurepo and EONIA Swap rates in order to reveal 
this small but significant difference.  This provides some evidence that the repo market suffered 
either directly or indirectly from elevated counterparty risk during the crisis but to far less a n 
extent than the unsecured interbank market.  Even when the premium is significantly different 
from zero it remains about one-tenth of the size of the EONIA-OIS spread.  This small premium 
could be related to the presence of risks of non-delivery of collateral (or funds) as described by 
Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2009).  However, non -delivery is not a significant risk for 
transactions undertaken on the BTEC automated trading system (ATS) since the counterparty 
risk is assumed by the central clearer, LCH Clearnet Ltd.  While it is possible that the remaining 
premium reflects a small but significant probability of a failure of the Clearnet system itself , we 
regard it as more likely that counterparty risk infected the secondary repo market indirectly.  
This would arise through the anticipation of  improved liquidity provision by the ECB following 
shocks to counterparty risk in the  unsecured interbank market.  For example, if repo market 
participants become aware of sharp changes in counterparty risk in the unsecured interbank 
market  this  may  lead  to  expectations  of  liquidity  easing  by  the  ECB  in  its  forthcoming 
operations.  This in turn can be expected to affect liquidity provision in the secondary interbank 
repo market because participants may decide to wait for better rates on offer in official 
                                                           
7 Swap interest rate deals are settled on the basis of the profit or loss made on the fixed rate that is swapped 
for the floating rate so there is only netting-off risk.  This is usually very small relative to amounts that are 
traded in the alternative unsecured lending market and so the difference between these rates mainly reflects 
interbank counterparty risk. 12 
 
operations.  In this case the repo rate available in the interbank repo market would reflect some 
counterparty risk or at least anticipate the rate that is going to be available in ECB operations as 
a result of such risks recently experienced in the unsecured secondary market. 
 
3. Repo Markets and Repo Market Indicators of Funding Liquidity Risk 
Construction of Indicators from Official Operations 
In the case of all operations we gathered information about the announcement of the operation 
and the reported outcome of the operation.
8    The exact time of news releases was recorded.  
In addition to the excess yield over the policy rate (and the excess of the weighted average yield 
over the policy rate), surprises in the amount issued and demanded relative to amounts 
maturing or announced as ‘intended’ are the focus of our empirical examination.  In the last 
phase  (the  fixed-rate  full-allotment  period) we  also  consider  the  change  in  the  outstanding 
supply as an important variable (this is different from other studies where the surprise supply is 
based on the difference between what was announced as the intended supply and what was 
actually allocated).  The reason we consider this new indicator of surprise supply is because 
intended supply in the past was usually related to expected amounts maturing from previous 
operations but during the last phase of the crisis intended supply did not relate strongly with 
amounts maturing from previous  operations.   Clearly,  when supply  (amount outstanding)  is 
increasing significantly more than is apparent from the supply in excess of announced “intended 
supply”,  we  are  likely  to  observe  significant  changes  in  the  interbank  repo  rate  and  in 
microstructural  characteristics  of  the  repo  market.    So  the  alternative  definition  of  supply 
surprise is appropriate in our view. 
 
Description of OTC and Electronic Repo Markets and Construction of Liquidity Risk Indicators 
The secondary repo market in Europe is surveyed on a semi-annual basis by the European Repo 
Council  of  the  Securities  Industry  and  Financial  Markets  Association  (SIFMA).    The  survey 
provides a snapshot of the volume of repo trades outstanding on a single day in June and 
December each year and various other indicators of the market structure and growth.  This 
                                                           
8 This information was gathered from the ECB website and from news releases on Bloomberg. 13 
 
survey reveals that repo volume reached a high point of 6,504 bln EUR in June 2007.  It grew at a 
rate of roughly 20% each year between June 2001 and June 2007 and when the financial crisis 
hit it declined to 4,633 bln EUR in December 2008 before recovering to 4,868 bln EUR in June 
2009.  This implies that it was around the same size as the US inter-dealer repo market in US 
Treasuries in June 2007.  Anonymous electronic trading represents about 25% of repo volume 
but this proportion has fluctuated recently with a surge in voice brokered business occurring at 
the height of the crisis when a flight to liquidity required improved search mechanisms and an 
avoidance of counterparty risk.  The most recent survey shows that more than 80% of collateral 
used in repos is made up of European government bonds and nearly 30% is represented by 
German government bonds alone.  German government bonds held a steady share of around 
25% in most of the previous surveys.  Italian bonds are also well represented with a share of 
between 12 and 15% in recent surveys. 
The segment of the secondary repo market that is studied here is the BrokerTec electronic, 
order-driven repo market provided by ICAP plc.  The BrokerTec platform provides the leading 
venue  for  electronic  inter-dealer  trading  in  European  repos  mainly  covering  Euro  zone 
government debt.  There are more than 70 participating banks.  Nearly half of these banks are 
also  Primary  Dealers  in  one  or  more  of  the  underlying  government  bond  markets
9.   All 
participants have equal access and rights on the trading platform.  There are no designated or 
‘specialist’ liquidity suppliers.  To be able to trade most of the repo products available on the 
platform, participants are required to be members of the Central Counterparty clearing system 
or have access through a third party clearer.  Since this is a collateralized lending market it has 
reduced counterparty risk relative to unsecured markets.  Credit risk is further reduced because 
of  the  balance  sheet  netting,  settlement  netting  and  centralized  margining  for  most  repo 
contracts traded on the platform.  There is substantial pre- and post-trade transparency in this 
market for all of the participants but there is no real-time provision of market data to non-
participants.    Participants  can  view  available  depth  in  the  market.    Limit  orders  are  simply 
entered by participants and this provides opportunities for trading to occur.  Trading is done 
only by accepting the specified quantities in the available limit orders.  There is no negotiation 
                                                           
9 There are 42 Primary Dealers listed as members of RepoClear and these are also members of the BrokerTec 
repo trading platform.  RepoClear is part of the LCH Clearnet clearing house providing clearing, margin, netting 
and other facilities for trading on BrokerTec’s repo platform; see, 
http://www.lchclearnet.com/membership/ltd/current_membership.asp. 14 
 
over  trade  quantities  or  prices  after  trades  are  executed.    The  platform  permits  automatic 
replenishing of limit orders and pending orders are only visible to the firm entering the order.  
Pending orders do not have priority over ‘shown’ amounts at the same rate.   Anonymity is 
preserved in most cases throughout trading and settlement (a Central Counterparty Clearer 
took both sides of all the trades considered in this study).  The market automatically opens at 
06:45 London time and closes automatically at 17:15.  Outside of these times the system will not 
allow an order to be entered.  There is no special starting mechanism.  
 
BTEC Data 
The  data  from  BrokerTec  contains  time-stamped  records  for  all  order  events  and  trades 
conducted on the BrokerTec electronic platform for the period from March 2003 to March 2009 
(our analysis concentrates on data from 2
nd Jan 2006).  This includes contracts for a wide range 
of repo collateral and terms to maturity.  Secondary market repo volume was increasing in the 
pre-crisis period (see the Figure [10] below and also the reported increases in volumes on the 
secondary  repo  market  according  to  SIFMA  surveys).    It  is  apparent  that  the  crisis  period 
characterized  by  generous  funding  by  the  ECB  (through  low,  fixed-rate,  full-allotment 
operations)  is  associated  with  reduced  secondary  repo  market  trading  which  is  tentative 
evidence of a substitution effect arising from the step-up in ECB provision of liquidity.  Table [2] 
provides details about the incidence of trades and of “limit order” activity for General Collateral 
repo contracts. In total, there are almost 0.5 million order records and 130,000 trade records.  It 
is clear from this table that most activity occurs for terms that are very short.  Roughly 95% of 
GC activity is for contracts with start dates that are within a few days of the contract date and 
that last only a single overnight period.   
The dataset contains records of transactions and limit order events associated with at least one 
general collateral contract for each country and a large number of specific collateral contracts.  
Table  [3]  shows  the  volume  traded  within  different  sub-samples  for  the  GC  contracts  at 
‘overnight’  (O-N),  ‘tomorrow-next’  (T-N),  settlement-next  (S-N),  one-week  and  one-month 
terms.  Most activity is associated with general collateral repos at the “tomorrow-next” term 
and with specific collateral repos (usually about 6 bonds in each country) at the T-N and S-N 
terms.  The GCs selected are mostly contracts that restrict the collateral to non-bills and bonds 
with maturity below 10 years (i.e., the most general contracts).  Data for Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands and Portugal are included.  Italy is not covered since 15 
 
most of the electronic trading activity in Italian GC repos is done on the MTS platform and only 
sparsely on BrokerTec.  In the case of specific collateral contracts, we focus on repo data that 
pertains to the use of benchmark sovereign bonds at various maturities (the specific bonds 
chosen were benchmarks as defined by the MTS trading platform).  Our selection is motivated 
by  the  availability  of  activity  in  the  repo  dataset.    Our  selection  process  gives  a  good 
representation of the entire dataset.  It should be noted that there does exist a European wide 
GC  contract  that  is  not  traded  on  the  BrokerTec  platform.    However,  according  to  SIFMA 
surveys, German collateral represents the largest fraction of all collateral pledged against repo 
borrowing  in  Europe,  so  the  German  GC  repo  is  probably  more  liquid  than,  and  almost  as 
general as, the European repo. 
A reasonable reference point for our analysis is the German GC which is quite general in the 
type  of  collateral  that  can  be  delivered  against  it,  is  of  high  quality  in  terms  of  the  credit 
worthiness of the issuer of the collateral and is a very liquid contract for most of the sample.
10  
Most other contracts in Europe can be regarded as either more special or  of lower quality (in 
terms of  liquidity,  credit  quality  and perhaps also in terms of the quality of counterparties 
involved).   
 
4. Hypotheses and Econometric Approach to Testing 
Our econometric methodology is designed to address two main propositions.  These are; 
Proposition 1: 
1. Bidding aggressiveness and other indicators of ‘funding liquidity risk aversion’ in official ECB 
repo auctions is anticipated by similar variables in the secondary repo market. 
Proposition 2: 
                                                           
10 It is not straightforward to compare different repo contracts across Europe on the basis of the repo rate 
alone.  The effects of the maturity of the underlying bond and the term of the repo contract are complex 
enough but the degree of ‘specialness’ is another, potentially more important, confounding factor.  This is 
because specialness drives repo rates down (perhaps to levels much lower than the German GC rate) while 
inferior quality (lack of liquidity or low credit quality of the underlying bond for example) will generally drive 
repo rates up.  It is therefore possible that the rate pertaining to the use of a low quality bond of a periphery 
country could be special enough to drive repo rates into the same neighbourhood as the German GC rate. 16 
 
2.  Unanticipated  auction  outcomes  affect  quality  of  the  secondary  repo  market  (its 
microstructural characteristics and behavior). 
We conduct our econometric analysis with data of daily frequency.  Our daily data is based on 
averages of observations made at 15 minute intervals.  This allows us to ignore many of the 
issues addressed by Brunetti et al.(2009) associated with intraday seasonality.   
As mentioned in the introduction, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2010) use bidding aggressiveness in 
ECB reverse repo auctions as a measure of ‘funding liquidity risk’ (hereafter, for convenience, we 
will  refer  to  this  as  ‘liquidity  risk’).    It  is  therefore  natural  to  consider  whether  there  are 
analogous measures that can be compiled from microstructure variables in the secondary repo 
market.  Brunetti et al. consider the effects of surprise outcomes (‘news’) from auctions as 
determinants of the changes in various measures of market quality post-auction.  We consider 
similar effects but also examine whether secondary repo market conditions anticipate liquidity 
risk aversion in forthcoming auctions.   
A point of clarification is in order regarding comparisons made between repo rates (bid or ask) 
from the interbank market and those from bidding behavior in official operations.  Contracts in 
the secondary market are traded as repos rather than reverse repos.  In reverse repo auctions 
the cash funding is the object being bid for or offered while in repo markets the offers and bids 
are for the collateral.  Thus, the aggressive bidding by participants in ECB reverse repo auctions 
is the analogue of aggressive offering (high offer yield) in the secondary repo market.  Likewise, 
relatively high bid yields in the secondary repo market are equivalent to timid expressions of 
interest in acquiring collateral for funds provided.  Aggressive ask yields in the secondary repo 
market tend to be significantly above the expected official ECB target rate of interest (although 
this is not true for the period with fixed-rate, full-allotment auctions).  When there is elevated 
liquidity risk aversion, the bid-ask spread may widen in the secondary market (i.e., despite ask 
yields rising when participants are keen to obtain funding, bid-side yields may rise by even more 
than the offer yields indicating that supply is contracting). 
*** Names for variables…. 
(A-T)  
interbank market premium? 
Inter-dealer premium? 17 
 
B2B premium 
Secondary Mkt Premium? 
AVG Interbank Premium 
(Y-T) 
Target gap 
Auction premium?  
Excess over Official rate 
Average Premium in auction? 
WAVG Auction Premium 
Premium on Planned Rate? 
 
(B-A) 
AVG Bid-ask spread? 
AVG Bid-ask spread? 
AVG Interbank Bid-Ask Spread 
AVG Interbank spread? 
Let, ‘A’ denote the offer yield and ‘B’ denote the bid yield in the secondary market.  If ‘T’ is the 
ECB official target rate then ln(1+A-T) is a measure of funding liquidity risk aversion which, if 
small  enough,  can  be  approximated  by  [A-T].    For  convenience  we  make  this  obvious 
approximation elsewhere without alerts.  We call [A-T] the ‘ask target gap’.  Another indicator 
of liquidity risk aversion is how far bid yields exceed offer yields.  We will call it the ‘bid ask 
spread’.  Therefore [B-A] is therefore an additional indicator of funding liquidity risk.
11 
                                                           
11 It is possible that these two measures would interact multiplicatively to produce a more flexible indicator of 
such risk aversion.  We leave the exploration of such non-linear effects for future research. 18 
 
There  are  other  microstructure  variables  that  could  provide  additional  information  about 
liquidity risk aversion.  We derive and use a variable to represent imbalance in liquidity on each 
side of the market.  For example, a relatively small bid quantity could imply elevated liquidity 
risk aversion even if the bid yield is quite low.  The imbalance in liquidity on the offer side 
relative to the quantity on the bid side of the market is likely to be indicative of heightened 
liquidity risk aversion since it indicates excess latent demand for funding (we denote this as; LIQ 
= ask liquidity / bid liquidity).  LIQ can also be included in the econometric specification on its 
own or as a multiplicative interactive term.  We include such terms in our empirical analysis 
where they are significant.  This regression is applied to data from the pre-full-allotment phase 
of  the  crisis  (when  auctions  were  still  based  on  competitive  bidding  and  discriminatory 
allocation). 
Thus,  to  address  proposition  1,  we  test  whether  indicators  of  repo  market  risk  aversion 
displayed in the secondary repo market can be used to explain the measured aggressiveness of 
bidding in  forthcoming  ECB  reverse  repo  auctions.   Specifically,  let          be  denoted the 
‘target gap’, i.e., the difference between the weighted average rate and target rate occurring in 
the auction held on day t.  In fact we can also consider other measures from auction results that 
could represent the same underlying risk aversion behavior such as the number of bidders or 
the amount bid in excess of what is normal or expected but we leave these alternatives for 
future work.  Thus, taking the ‘target gap’ as representative of funding liquidity risk aversion 
revealed by the behavior of participants in official auctions, we can test whether the following 
regression  has  explanatory  power,  and  if  so,  conclude  that  such  behavior  is  anticipated  by 
pricing behavior and imbalance in order density in the secondary repo market in advance of 
auctions.  The regression we employ in this case is as follows; 
                                                                                           (1) 
Where the last term is a random error process and           are positive integers generating a 
lag structure that is sufficient to incorporate potential statistical significance (we general allow 
for 4 lags in our empirical application).  The lagged dependent variable is included as though it is 
a single period lag but this is misleading.  The lag that is intended is an event period lag and this 
is generally more than a single period.  In fact we include the previous outcome from all three of 
the main types of events examined in this study (namely, MROs, LTROs, SLTROs and OTs). 19 
 
The error in equation (1) can be considered the news (or unanticipated) part of the auction 
result.  Since  heterscedasticity  is  a  feature  of  the  dependent  and  explanatory  variables  we 
standardize all variables by use of an option implied variance from a major European stock 
market that is correlated with the underlying stresses in the repo market (namely, the VDAX).  
We simply divide all variables by the VDAX that was recorded four working days before the date 
of observing the dependent variable.  The fourth lag was chosen because we use up to four lags 
of the explanatory variables in the regression.  We do not de-mean the variables before dividing 
by the lagged VDAX.  It is more usual to use a fitted value for the variance when employing such 
a weighted least squares approach but we prefer to keep all our standardization consistent 
across all types of news variables and for the variables in the complementary regression that we 
outline below.  The interpretation of the adjusted variables is simply as measures of funding 
liquidity risk relative to a more general risk indicator.   
We note that equation (1) is different from the approach taken by Brunetti, Filippo and Harris 
(2009) in their study of the unsecured interbank market.  They regard the news variable as 
directly observable.  In the case of the repo rate itself, Brunetti et al. obtain predictions of the 
target rate and simply use the difference between this and the auction outcome as a news 
shock which they regard as potentially important in explaining the post-auction quality of the 
unsecured interbank market.
12  In the case of the repo market it is not clear that  expectations 
about the target rate are a valid indicator of the true expectations of bidding aggressiveness in 
auctions.  Our approach is also different in a less important way.  This is regarding the frequency 
of our observations.  We regard daily frequency as adequate in  revealing the behavior of most 
interest. 
Our second proposition is that the unexpected outcome of auctions adversely affects liquidity 
conditions in the secondary repo market in the post -auction period.  This motivates a second 
regression which takes the error term from equation 1 and uses it as a surprise variable to 
explain liquidity conditions (or measures of liquidity risk aversion) in the secondary repo market 
in the days after the official operations.   This part of our analysis   follows  quite closely  the 
specification used by Brunetti et al. (2009) to study the effects of such operations on conditions 
                                                           
12 They compile rate expectations based on 27 separate Reuters’ Survey of Treasurers involving 40 European 
commercial banks held during their sample period. 20 
 
in the unsecured interbank market.
13  The main difference is that we use the lagged value of the 
VDAX as a standardizing variable.  Our model is as follows;  
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Where the variables are the same as those described for equation 1.  All variables (except    
which is already adjusted) are standardized by using the four day lag of the VDAX.  We examined 
the issue of causality between the VDAX and repo market uncertainty and this indicated that 
causality  runs  entirely  from  repo  market  uncertainty  to  the  VDAX  and  not  in  the  other 
direction.
14  
In the second phase of the crisis there is no indicator of bid aggressiveness in ECB auctions since 
all bids were satisfied at the policy rate.  In fact, the surprise in the bid quantity rather than the 
rate itself may represent liquidity risk aversion in this phase .  In this case the amount bid  in 
excess of what might be considered normal (or above what is expected to be maturing) could be 
considered  an  indicator  of  liquidity  risk  aversion.  If  this  is  so,  then  we  require  only  a 
replacement of the dependent variable in equation (1) to obtain evidence that the secondary 
repo market anticipates auction outcomes.  We leave this for future work. 
Our econometric specification involves a relatively large number of explanatory variables.  Since 
there are a relatively small number of auction events (particularly SLTROs) in some of the sub-
sample periods we easily run into difficulty with loss of degrees of freedom.  We make some 
gains  in  estimation  degrees  of  freedom  in  the  case  of  regression  (2)  since  we  conduct  the 
analysis jointly for different country-specific contracts.  For some groupings it makes sense to 
apply parameter restrictions that improve estimation efficiency.  This is only possible for the 
case of regression (2).  The first regression is only conducted using independent variables based 
on the German GC-TN contract.  The details regarding the specific restrictions we make and 
about the instruments we included are dealt with in the results section. 
 
                                                           
13 They largely follow the approach taken by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen et al. (2002 and 
2007). 
14 Results are available from the authors. 21 
 
5. Results and Interpretation of Results 
Description of variables 
The secondary market indicators of ‘funding liquidity risk aversion’ were compiled by sampling 
the BrokerTec electronic orderbook.  The orderbook was reconstructed using every limit order 
event  and  each  trade  event.  This  revealed  the  offer  yield,  bid-offer  yield  spread  and  the 
liquidity available at the three best bid and offer yields at each event.  Our analysis is based on 
the  daily  average  of  observations  made  at  15  minute  frequency.    As  described  above,  we 
examine the offered repo rates relative to the target rate set by the ECB.  
To avoid a lot of repetition we give descriptions for the German General-Collateral Tomorrow-
Next contract only.  This is quite representative of the other contracts in our dataset.  Thus, 
Table [4] contains the basic descriptive statistics relating to the explanatory variables used in 
regressions (1).  Similar variables (based on country-specific contracts) are used in regression (2) 
and a SURE regression is employed so that parameter restrictions can be applied across some 
groups of countries or contract types. The news terms in regression (2) are always the same 
variables taken from the results of the first regression.   
Note that, in the case of equation (1) the dependent variable is either the marginal rate or 
weighted average rate obtained in the ECB auction less the most recently announced target 
rate.  We divide this by the VDAX(4
th lag).  A similar variable is constructed from secondary 
market rates to act as one of the explanatory variables.  In this case the target rate is subtracted 
from the average of the offer rate observed at 15 minute intervals for each date and this is 
divided by the VDAX(4
th lag).  The bid-offer yield spread is treated in the same way (averaging 
over 15 minute observations and dividing by the VDAX).  In the case of the relative liquidity 
variable (i.e., the ratio of offer quantity to bid quantity) we assume this can be set to 1 if there is 
no  offer  quantity  or  bid  quantity  and  dropped  where  there  is  zero  on  the  bid  side.    The 
descriptive statistics indicate that the basic explanatory variables do not have excessive outliers. 
The descriptive statistics reflect the differences between the three periods studied.  Even with 
division by the VDAX the basic statistics reveal the significant changes in conditions over the 
three main periods studied.  Consider the auction yield relative to the policy ‘target’ rate.  This 
has a mean of 3.572 bps in the pre-crisis period.  It reduces in size in the first crisis phase to 
1.761  bps  and  then becomes  negative  in  the  last period  at  -55.884  bps indicating that the 
interbank repo rate was at a large discount on the policy target rate in the full-allotment regime.  22 
 
The same pattern applies for the standardized data despite the coincident rise in the VDAX.  
Also, the bid-ask yield spread has a mean as low as 1.855 bps in the pre-crisis period.  This rises 
to nearly 4.75 bps in the first crisis period and widens further to 12.393 bps in the full-allotment 
regime.    This  spread  (for  TN  GC  contracts)  averaged  over  core  and  periphery  groups  of 
countries, is shown in the Figure [11].  The VDAX index is also included to show the relation 
between general risk (and liquidity risk-aversion).   
Relative liquidity (ask quantity/bid quantity) is indicative of liquidity risk aversion in the sense 
that ‘ask quantity’ represents latent demand for liquidity while ‘bid quantity’ represents latent 
supply.  Ask liquidity was generally much greater than bid quantity.  Relative liquidity had a 
mean of 1.745 in the pre-crisis period.  This rose to 3.509 in the first crisis period and then 
dropped again to 1.831 in the full-allotment regime.  It seems likely that the last period was 
associated with excess supply of liquidity and the reduced relative quantity (imbalance) reflects 
overall easing of conditions in the last phase. 
The daily average volume at each of the first three levels of the orderbook (offer-side) for the 
GC Tomorrow-Next (TN) contract is shown in Figure [12].  There is progressively less liquidity 
deeper into the book. This also reveals that there was a slight growth in liquidity available at all 
levels through the crisis period.  Figure [13] shows the liquidity on best three levels of the bid 
side of the market.  It is important to note that there was generally more liquidity on the ask 
side of the book than on the bid side.  This reflects an imbalance in latent demand for funds 
rather than for the collateral.  
 
Discussion of results from Regression (1) 
The results for the regression shown as equation (1) above are provided in Tables [5] and [6].  
We show the case of the “away-rate” as dependent variable (this is the “weighted average bid 
rate” resulting in the auctions minus the policy target rate).  The regressions have explanatory 
variables (that predate the auction events) from the secondary market in German GC repo.  We 
found the German GC contract to be quite representative of other countries that had liquid GC 
contracts.  Table [5] contains the results for the MRO events while Table [6] contains results 
pertaining to all LTROs (standard or supplementary).  In both sets of results the explanatory 
variables contain the lags of the dependent variable as well as lags of other similar variables 
from other types of events, (specifically, the “away-rate” and “target-gap” from the most recent 23 
 
previous auction of each type).  These lagged variables act as controls for endogeneity of the 
other explanatory variables (i.e., the fact that they could be reflecting the effects of previous 
auction events rather than anticipating current ones.  In both regressions all three of the lagged 
auction result variables are highly statistically significant (not necessarily the same three).   
The secondary repo market variables included in regression (1) are; (a) the ask rate in excess of 
the prevailing policy rate averaged over observations observed at 15 minute intervals denoted 
“AWAYGCDE”, (b) the daily average bid-offer yield spread denoted “SYNGCDE”, (c) the average 
daily  relative  liquidity  denote  “LIQGCDE”.  The  regressors  and  dependent  variable  are  all 
standardized  with  respect  to  the  VDAX  and  the  explanatory  variables  from  the  secondary 
markets  enter  with  4  lags  starting  at  lag  2  (pre-dating  the  announcements  relating  to  the 
auctions). 
In support of proposition 1 we would expect liquidity conditions to deteriorate in advance of 
auctions where more favorable conditions are expected (and in the market that follows).  Thus 
predictably smaller excess weighted average rates in auctions should be associated with smaller 
excess yields in the secondary market in advance.  The secondary market bid ask yield spread 
and  the  relative  liquidity  should  also  be  positively  related to  the  dependent  variable  which 
indicates  generosity  of  supply  at auctions.    The results  for  the  case  of MRO  events  do  not 
provide support for this proposition.  All of the significant coefficients are in fact negative.  The 
results for the LTRO events are mixed but more supportive of proposition (1) on balance.  One 
of the significant coefficients on the lags of the “AWAY” variable is positive while two of the 
three  significant coefficients  on  the  lags  of the  bid-ask  yield  spread are  positive.    The  only 
significant coefficient on the relative liquidity variables is positive. 
 
Discussion of results from Regression (2) 
The first 2 regressions provide us with residuals that form the basis of “news” variables relating 
to  the  outcome  of  the  MRO  and  LTRO  auction  events  respectively.    These  are  explanatory 
variables in the regressions relating to Equation (2).  This time the liquidity conditions in the 
secondary market are expressed as a function of recent surprise outcomes from the auctions.  
We allow 5 lags of the news variables enter in these regressions and also include 3 lags of the 
dependent variable from all three regressions in each of the three equations.  Table [7] shows 
the  results  for  the  three  regressions.    This  reveals  a  high  degree  of  persistence  in  the 24 
 
microstructure conditions with the first lag of the dependent variables being very significant in 
their own regressions and often being quite significant in the other regressions.  However, the 
main  focus  of  our  analysis  is  proposition  (2)  which  requires  that  surprise  outcomes  from 
auctions  (unexpectedly  high  settlement  yields)  would  predict  deterioration  in  liquidity 
conditions in the secondary repo market post-auction.  This is consistent with positive impulse 
response coefficients with respect to the news variables in equation (2).  We see from the 
significant estimated coefficients that the evidence is mixed for the case of MRO events.  The 
yield gap has a significantly negative response initially and then a mix of positive and negative 
coefficients on the lags. The initial response of the spread to MRO events is very significantly 
positive but there is no significant parameter beyond lag 1.  Relative liquidity does not appear to 
have any significant parameters on the MRO shocks.  The response to LTRO events appears to 
be more consistently positive and in the case of the spread there are a number of significant 
lagged effects.  The estimated impulse-response functions for the case of LTRO news is shown 
for the case of the three indicators of market liquidity in Figure [14] (yield minus policy-rate, bid-
ask  yield  spread  and  relative  liquidity  respectively).  These  reveal  that  the  reaction  in  the 
secondary market is for a temporary rise in stress indicators.  
In the case of regression (2) we can extend the analysis to accommodate similar regressions for 
other countries.  In particular, we jointly estimate the regressions for GC contracts in the case of 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.  The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) estimates 
of coefficients that are restricted to be equal across countries are given in table 8.  Panel A 
contains the case where coefficients on the MRO news variable are restricted to be equal across 
the three equations.  We see that the restriction is not rejected at the 5% significance level for 
the  “awayrate”  equation  (almost  acceptable  at  the  10%  level).    However,  the  coefficient 
estimates that are significantly different from zero are negative and this does not support the 
hypothesis  that  unexpected  innovations  to  liquidity  risk  aversion  in  auctions  causes 
deterioration in “awayrates” in the secondary market. 
While the cross country equality restriction is not accepted for the case of the bid-offer yield 
spread as a function of the MRO news variables, we see that the first lag has a very significantly 
positive parameter.  In fact, all of the other parameters estimates are positive although not 
significant.  The “relative liquidity” variable also has a negative reaction to MRO news which 
does not support the hypothesis that deterioration in auction market conditions give risk to 25 
 
deterioration in the secondary market (although the cross equation restriction is comfortably 
satisfied). 
Panel B contains the results for the case of cross country equality in coefficients on lagged news 
from LTRO auctions.  In this case nearly all important parameters in all three equations are 
positive and many are significantly so.  Also the cross-country restriction is satisfied at the 10% 
level of significance or better in the case of the “awayrate” and “relative liquidity”.  There does 
not appear to be a declining response to news shocks for the case of the “awayrate” implying 
permanent  effects.    For  the  bid-offer  yield  spread  the  response  coefficients  begin  positive, 
becomes significantly positive at lag 2 and then becomes significantly negative at lags 4 and 5.  
In the case of the response coefficients for “relative liquidity” with respect to LTRO shocks, we 
note that all but the fifth lag are positive.  The second lag is very significantly positive.  In 
general,  this  set  of  results  support  the  hypothesis  that  risk  aversion  displayed  in  auctions 
translates to similar situations in the secondary market.  Panel C shows results  for the case 
where response coefficients to both MRO and LTRO auction events are restricted to be equal 
across countries.  This restriction is only accepted for the case of relative liquidity.  In other 
respects the results do not change a lot from those of Panels A and B.  The LTRO results seem 
most consistent with supporting the hypothesis being tested. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper increases our understanding of the effects of ECB auction events on secondary repo 
market microstructure particularly as a result of the financial crisis and the policy responses that 
it prompted.  A detailed description of ECB monetary policy operations was provided and this 
revealed interesting information about the degree to which funding liquidity risk was relieved 
during two important periods of the recent crisis.  The evidence obtained suggests that the repo 
market conditions mirror the outcomes of conditions pertaining in previous official operations.  
More favorable outcomes than expected at auctions gives rise to more liquidity in the secondary 
repo market in the post-auction period.  There is also some evidence that auction conditions are 
anticipated by the secondary market controlling for other causes.  This was most striking for the 
case of longer term (including supplementary) operations.   
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Figure 1: The yield for funding against Sovereign German General Collateral with term of ‘Tomorrow-Next’ is shown 
against the announced policy rate of the ECB.  This shows that after the introduction of fixed-rate full-allotment auctions 
yields in the interbank repo market went below the target rate.  The GC rate shown is a daily average based on mid 
yields observed at 15 minute frequency. 
 
Figure 2: Outstanding funding related to ECB reverse repos from Long Term Operations and Supplementary Longer Term 
Operations. 
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Figure 3: Number of bidders bidding for financing from the ECB as a time-series. MROs occur at weekly frequency. 
 
Figure 4:  The Supply through different types of repo auction. 
Number of Bidders in MRO auctions
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Figure 5: Supply and demand in repo auctions. 
 
Figure 6: The deviation of the marginal rate obtained in ECB repo auctions from the rate intended.  The EONIA-OIS 
spread is also shown and is suggestive of strong positive correlation.  Note that in the last phase the allotment takes 
place at a fixed price so that there is no premium in auctions. 
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EONIA-OIS Spread and the Auction - Target Spread
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Figure 7. This figure shows the relation between the EONIA-OIS spread and the gap between the marginal rate and the 
weighted average rate obtained by participants in MROs. 
 
Figure 8 Counterparty Risk as measured by (i) the gap between EONIA 1-Week rate and the associated Over-Week Swap 
rate and (ii) the gap between EONIA 1-Week and associated 1-Week Eurepo rate. 
EONIA-OIS Spread and the WAVG Rate in auction - reference rate
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Figure 9: Repo risk premium as the difference between the 1-Week Eurepo rate and the 1-Week Swap rate. 
 
 
Figure 10: Volume of General Collateral Tomorrow-Next and Specials repo trading on the BrokerTec platform. 
































































































































































































































































Figure 11: The Bid-Offer Spread is shown for various countries along with the VDAX index. 
 
 
Figure 12: Volume at the first three levels of the offer side of the BrokerTec orderbook (daily average based on 
observations at 15 minute intervals). 
Bid-ask spread - TN
Average for AT,BE,DE,FR,NL





































































Figure 13: Volume at the first three levels of the bid side of the BrokerTec orderbook (daily average based on 
observations at 15 minute intervals). 
 
 
Figure 14: This displays the last 5 coefficient estimates in each of the three regressions shown in Table [7].  These can be 
regarded as impulse-response functions (the average response in each period following the auction surprise).  The three 
response variables are the Yield Gap over the policy rate, the bid-ask spread and the relative liquidity (offer amount / 
bid amount).  The raw variables were standardized using the VDAX index as explained in the text. 
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Type  Full Sample 
Jan 2006,  Mar 2009 
Pre-Crisis 
Jan 2006,  Jul 2007 
Pre-Full Allot Phase 
Aug 2007,  Sep 2008 
Full Allotment Phase 
Oct 2008,  Mar 2009 
MROs  166  83  60  23 
LTROs  38  19  14  5 
SLTROs  26  0  13  13 
OTs  55  15  35  5 
Total  285  117  122  46 
Table 1: Number of official monetary policy operations by type and phase. 
 
Term  Orderbook events  Trades 
Overnights     
Overnight & O-Next  127,681  43,012 
Tomorrow-Next  252,255  74,828 
Spot-Next  33,910  4,926 
Corporate-Next  557  68 
Sub-total:  414,403  122,834 
% of Total of Column  86.8  95.2 
1 Week     
Overnight-Week  76  2 
Tomorrow-Week  2,518  276 
Spot-Week  21,514  2,870 
Corporate-Week  7,394*  1,252 
Sub-total:  31,501  4,400 
% of Total of Column  6.6  3.4 
2 & 3 Weeks     
O-2W,T-2W,S-2W or C-2W  5,345*  430 
O-3W,T-3W,S-3W or C-3W  801*  84 
Sub-total:  6,146  514 
% of Total of Column  1.3  0.4 
1 Month     
O-M,T-M,S-M or C-M  25,362*  1,298 
% of Total of Column  5.3  1.0 
Total  477,413  129,772 
Table 2: Events on Orderbook and Trades, by Term and Type, May 05 – Apr 09. * Indicates that an adjustment was made 
to correct for a large number of orders in late 2006 that relate to a temporary testing of automated trading. 
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   PANEL 1: Phase 1 the pre-crisis period  
 Term  ON  TN  SN  Week  Month    
Country  Millions  Share  Millions  Share  Millions  Share  Millions  Share  Millions  Share 
AT 
             
3,600   0% 
          
47,975   3% 
         
1,475   2% 
                     
-   0% 
          
200   1% 
BE            21,375   2% 
       
202,475   14% 
         
6,725   9% 
             
300   3% 
     
2,125   14% 
DE         109,250   12% 
       
850,275   58%        52,875   72% 
         
3,200   37% 
     
3,300   22% 
ES 
                  
100   0% 
          
25,625   2% 
         
3,400   5% 
         
3,375   39% 
     
2,575   17% 
FR         750,450   84% 
       
115,450   8% 
                
50   0% 
         
1,250   14% 
     
6,600   44% 
GR 
                         
-   0% 
          
19,225   1% 
             
175   0% 
                     
-   0% 
                 
-   0% 
IE 
                         
-   0% 
          
10,325   1% 
         
6,750   9% 
                     
-   0% 
                 
-   0% 
NL 
             
8,225   1% 
          
94,475   6% 
         
1,175   2% 
             
400   5% 
                 
-   0% 
PT 
                         
-   0% 
       
104,900   7% 
             
500   1% 
             
100   1% 
          
250   2% 
All         893,000  
 
   
1,470,725  
 
      73,125  
 




15,050     
    PANEL 2: Phase 2 pre-Lehman crisis response 
AT            41,700   3% 
          
52,100   3% 
         
2,000   3% 
         
2,175   1% 
          
100   2% 
BE         194,475   13% 
       
222,900   15% 
         
3,500   5% 
         
4,500   2% 
          
600   10% 
DE         411,450   27% 
       
751,575   49%        54,325   74%     234,725   93% 
     
4,300   74% 
ES 
             
4,800   0% 
             
3,725   0% 
                     
-   0% 
             
200   0% 
                 
-   0% 
FR         764,475   50% 
       
197,300   13% 
         
5,925   8% 
         
6,700   3% 
          
400   7% 
GR 
                         
-   0% 
       
173,875   11% 
         
4,025   5% 
         
2,575   1% 
          
350   6% 
IE 
             
2,975   0% 
             
6,775   0% 
             
425   1% 
             
375   0% 
                 
-   0% 
NL            83,175   5% 
          
78,775   5% 
         
1,725   2% 
         
1,775   1% 
                 
-   0% 
PT            29,625   2% 
          
42,450   3% 
         
1,475   2% 
             
450   0% 
             
50   1% 
All     1,532,675  
 
   
1,529,475  
 
      73,400  
 
   253,475  
 
     
5,800     
    PANEL 3: Phase 3 post-Lehman crisis response 
AT            83,250   6% 
          
36,625   1% 
         
1,350   1% 
         
9,200   4% 
     
4,425   12% 
BE         283,075   22% 
       
296,750   12% 
         
7,725   3%        12,975   6% 
     
2,050   5% 
DE         165,850   13% 
   
1,601,375   65%     154,175   69%     169,925   72% 
  
22,975   60% 
ES            22,325   2% 
          
14,175   1% 
             
200   0% 
             
825   0% 
             
50   0% 
FR         516,000   40% 
       
181,650   7%        16,550   7%        14,725   6% 
          
400   1% 
GR            28,700   2% 
       
147,275   6%        37,000   16% 
         
1,825   1% 
          
100   0% 
IE 
             
9,700   1% 
          
18,275   1% 
         
1,400   1% 
             
950   0% 
                 
-   0% 
NL         114,325   9% 
       
111,900   5% 
         
3,150   1%        19,100   8% 
     
4,850   13% 
PT            60,050   5% 
          
63,100   3% 
         
3,450   2% 
         
5,075   2% 
     
3,300   9% 
All     1,283,275     
   
2,471,125         225,000         234,600     
  
38,150     
Table 3: Traded volume within phases by contract and by maturity terms. Max highlighted. 
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Panel A: Statistics for Raw Variables 
Full Sample(843 obs)  minimum  maximum  mean  median  variance  fract25  fract75 
Yield Spread  -120.29  40.631  -6.053  4.023  640.853  -3.333  6.717 
Bid-Ask Spread  0.500  75.285  4.463  2.464  40.367  1.392  5.000 
Relative Liquidity  0.000  46.190  2.383  1.210  18.569  0.577  2.401 
VDAX  11.91000  74.00000  22.55386  19.08000  113.79622  15.50500  24.07500 
               
Pre-Crisis  (415 obs)  minimum  maximum  mean  median  variance  fract25  fract75 
Yield Spread  -39.85  31.952  3.572  5.392  64.968  3.708  6.943 
Bid-Ask Spread  0.500  7.500  1.855  1.500  1.211  1.130  2.261 
Relative Liquidity  0.000  30.000  1.745  0.954  8.198  0.392  1.974 
VDAX  11.91000  25.42000  16.32728  15.47000  8.24410  14.23000  18.05000 
               
Crisis Phase I (300 obs)  minimum  maximum  mean  median  variance  fract25  fract75 
Yield Spread  -97.96  40.631  1.761  3.131  149.972  -1.267  7.561 
Bid-Ask Spread  0.500  75.285  4.721  3.107  33.384  2.247  5.395 
Relative Liquidity  0.000  46.190  3.509  1.658  37.635  0.821  3.269 
VDAX  15.35000  36.59000  21.77547  21.28000  15.28580  18.84250  23.96500 
               
Crisis Phase II (128 obs)  minimum  maximum  mean  median  variance  fract25  fract75 
Yield Spread  -120.29  27.553  -55.884  -56.744  749.416  -76.223  -42.433 
Bid-Ask Spread  2.571  57.583  12.393  9.380  100.337  7.247  12.663 
Relative Liquidity  0.000  17.500  1.831  1.376  3.469  0.903  2.311 
VDAX  34.45000  74.00000  44.76055  42.86500  68.55949  38.58250  48.11750 
 
Panel B: Statistics for Standardized Variables (Division by VDAX) 
Full Sample  minimum  maximum  mean  median  variance  fract25  fract75 
Yield Spread  -20.93795  8.41123  -0.71074  0.94977  18.04820  -0.77219  1.60957 
Bid-Ask Spread  0.11114  13.67701  0.88020  0.56894  1.18078  0.33829  1.01507 
Relative Liquidity  0.00000  11.46198  0.53985  0.26040  1.05087  0.12512  0.52017 
               
               
Pre-Crisis  (415 obs)  minimum  maximum  mean  median  variance  fract25  fract75 
Yield Spread  -10.29449  6.88623  0.90432  1.34288  3.99925  0.85290  1.74352 
Bid-Ask Spread  0.11114  1.99663  0.46660  0.36934  0.08581  0.28060  0.56996 
Relative Liquidity  0.00000  7.75891  0.44142  0.23367  0.53291  0.09934  0.49140 
               
Crisis Phase I (300 obs)  minimum  maximum  mean  median  variance  fract25  fract75 
Yield Spread  -20.93795  8.41123  0.31386  0.68082  7.76396  -0.28242  1.59320 
Bid-Ask Spread  0.11228  13.67701  1.04612  0.67401  1.51826  0.48009  1.21019 
Relative Liquidity  0.00000  11.46198  0.78594  0.35341  2.07612  0.17415  0.69619 
               
Crisis Phase II (128 obs)  minimum  maximum  mean  median  variance  fract25  fract75 
Yield Spread  -20.93795  4.11799  -8.51450  -8.03475  19.11277  -12.11688  -6.14688 
Bid-Ask Spread  0.42406  9.51953  1.88785  1.39846  2.73146  1.10007  1.83008 
Relative Liquidity  0.00000  2.67215  0.27757  0.20259  0.08218  0.12975  0.33898 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for 843 daily observations of microstructure variables associated with the German 
Sovereign, General Collateral Repo contract for the ‘Tomorrow-Next’ term.  The usual basic descriptive statistics are 
provided and in the last two columns we include the first and third quartiles denoted Fract25 and Fract75 respectively.  
Panel A contains statistics on the raw data.  Panel B shows statistics for the  variables actually used in the regressions, 
i.e., the raw variable after it is divided by the VDAX index observed 4 days in advance. The Yield spread is based on the 
mid-quoted yields observed at 15 minute intervals between the open and close of the BrokerTec electronic repo market.  
The calculation of the bid-offer spread is explained in section [**].  The liquidity variable (previous to division by the 
VDAX) is the average of the log ratio of offered quantity on the first three levels of the limit orderbook relative to the 
total bid amount on the first three levels of the orderbook (once again, the daily average is derived from observations 
taken from the reconstructed orderbook at 15 minute intervals).   37 
 
Regression (1) - Dependent Variable: ‘AWAYMRO’ (The weighted average MRO rate less prevailing policy rate) 
Robust Standard Error Calculations 
Usable Observations     99      Degrees of Freedom    78 (Pre-Crisis and the Pre-Full Allotment Crisis Period) 
Independent variables based on German GC-TN contract 
Centered R Sq     0.62      R Bar Sq   0.522 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             1.819 
 
Variable  Coeff  Std Error  T-Stat 
Constant   0.384  0.241   1.593 
L2AWAYGCDE  -0.221  0.108  -2.046** 
L3AWAYGCDE   0.020  0.068   0.299 
L4AWAYGCDE   0.177  0.091   1.951* 
L5AWAYGCDE  -0.122  0.056  -2.153** 
L2SYNGCDE  -0.497  0.212  -2.343** 
L3SYNGCDE   0.061  0.134   0.453 
L4SYNGCDE  -0.183  0.162  -1.124 
L5SYNGCDE   0.227  0.147   1.545 
L2LIQGCDE   0.051  0.038   1.347 
L3LIQGCDE   0.017  0.071   0.247 
L4LIQGCDE  -0.116  0.043  -2.660*** 
L5LIQGCDE  -0.050  0.040  -1.246 
LGAPMRO   0.093  0.119   0.780 
LGAPLTRO   0.048  0.022   2.183** 
LGAPSLTRO  -0.052  0.028  -1.797 
LGAPOT  -0.383  0.139  -2.754** 
LAWAYMRO   0.007  0.089   0.080 
LAWAYLTRO   0.383  0.180   2.122** 
LAWAYSLTRO   0.086  0.191   0.451 
LAWAYOT   0.068  0.079   0.871 
 
Null Hypothesis : The Following Coefficients Are Zero 
Test 1: Zero Coeffs on... L0AWAYGCDE, L1AWAYGCDE, L2AWAYGCDE, L3AWAYGCDE        
Test 2: Zero Coeffs on...  L0SYNGCDE, L1SYNGCDE, L2SYNGCDE, L3SYNGCDE 
Test 3: Zero Coeffs on...  L0LIQGCDE, L1LIQGCDE, L2LIQGCDE, L3LIQGCDE 
Test 4: Zero Coeffs on...  LGAPMRO, LGAPLTRO, LGAPSLTRO, LGAPOT 
Test 5: Zero Coeffs on...  LAWAYMRO, LAWAYLTRO, LAWAYSLTRO, LAWAYOT 
Result 1. F(4,*)=      1.449 with Significance Level 0.214 
Result 2. F(4,*)=      2.302 with Significance Level 0.056 
Result 3. F(4,*)=      2.457 with Significance Level 0.043 
Result 4. F(4,*)=      2.237 with Significance Level 0.062 
Result 5. F(4,*)=      3.164 with Significance Level 0.013 
Table 5: Regression results for equation (1) applied in the case of the German GC contract.  All variables are weighted by 
the fourth lag of the VDAX index.  The dependent variable is the weighted average rate in MRO auctions expressed as a 
deviation from the prevailing policy rate.  Lags of independent variables are generally indicated by the first 2 characters 
of the name, where L2, L3, L4 and L5 refer to lags of 2, 3, 4 and 5 days previous to the settlement date of the MRO 
auctions. In the case of lagged auction results the ‘L’ indicates that the result from the previous auction is included 
regardless of the number of days previous.  The variables containing the last four characters GCDE are based on data 
from the secondary repo market in German General-Collateral Tomorrow-Next contract.  Variables with MRO, LTRO, 
SLTRO and OT respectively as the final three characters refer to observations based on recent MRO, LTRO, SLTRO and 
Fine Tuning auctions results.    The independent variables containing ‘AWAY’ in the name refer to the daily average of 
the offer yields on the German CG-TN contract observed at 15 minute intervals expressed as a deviation from the 
prevailing policy rate or, in the case of auction results, the weighted average yield reported for the auction as a 
deviation from the prevailing policy rate at that time.  The independent variables containing ‘SYN’ in the name refer to 
the daily average of the bid-offer yield spread on the German CG-TN contract observed at 15 minute intervals. The 
independent variables containing ‘LIQ’ in the name refer to the daily average of the log of offer liquidity relative to bid 
liquidity on the first three levels of the orderbook for the German CG-TN contract observed at 15 minute intervals.  
Variables with ‘GAP’ in the name refer marginal rate less policy rate in past auctions. 38 
 
Dependent Variable AWAY_SLTRO_LTRO (The weighted average SLTRO/LTRO rate less prevailing policy rate) 
Usable Observations     38      Degrees of Freedom     17 (Pre-Crisis and Pre-Lehman Periods) 
Independent variables based on German GC-TN contract 
Centered R Sq     0.868      R Bar Sq   0.714 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             2.83 
 
Variable  Coeff  StdError  T-Stat 
Constant   0.106  0.833   0.127 
L2AWAYGCDE  -1.047  0.219  -4.781*** 
L3AWAYGCDE   1.657  0.688   2.408** 
L4AWAYGCDE  -0.601  0.285  -2.105** 
L5AWAYGCDE  -0.352  0.360  -0.977 
L2SYNGCDE   1.293  0.487   2.653*** 
L3SYNGCDE  -0.156  0.307  -0.509 
L4SYNGCDE   3.622  1.133   3.195*** 
L5SYNGCDE  -0.946  0.504  -1.876* 
L2LIQGCDE  -0.249  0.170  -1.462 
L3LIQGCDE  -0.194  0.332  -0.585 
L4LIQGCDE   0.904  0.351   2.575*** 
L5LIQGCDE   0.187  0.226   0.830 
LGAPMRO  -0.309  0.246  -1.255 
LGAPLTRO   0.052  0.078   0.661 
LGAPSLTRO   0.183  0.068   2.683*** 
LGAPOT   0.018  0.380   0.049 
LAWAYMRO  -1.138  0.541  -2.101** 
LAWAYLTRO  -0.406  0.250  -1.624 
LAWAYSLTRO   0.152  0.711   0.213 
LAWAYOT   1.192  0.556   2.143** 
 
Null Hypothesis : The Following Coefficients Are Zero 
Test 1: Zero Coeffs on... L0AWAYGCDE, L1AWAYGCDE, L2AWAYGCDE, L3AWAYGCDE        
Test 2: Zero Coeffs on...  L0SYNGCDE, L1SYNGCDE, L2SYNGCDE, L3SYNGCDE 
Test 3: Zero Coeffs on...  L0LIQGCDE, L1LIQGCDE, L2LIQGCDE, L3LIQGCDE 
Test 4: Zero Coeffs on...  LGAPMRO, LGAPLTRO, LGAPSLTRO, LGAPOT 
Test 5: Zero Coeffs on...  LAWAYMRO, LAWAYLTRO, LAWAYSLTRO, LAWAYOT 
Result 1: F(4,*)=      6.199 with Significance Level 0.00005525 
Result 2: F(4,*)=      8.418 with Significance Level 0.00000087 
Result 3: F(4,*)=      2.349 with Significance Level 0.05189327 
Result 4: F(4,*)=      3.383 with Significance Level 0.00894184 
Result 5: F(4,*)=      2.435 with Significance Level 0.04504288 
Table 6: The variables used in this regression are the same as those described in the caption for Table 3 except for the 
dependent variable which in this case refers to the weighted average rate obtained in SLTRO and LTRO auctions as a 
deviation from the prevailing policy rate.  Once again all variables are standardized by dividing by the VDAX (lagged by 4 
days). 
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Regression: Equations (2) 
Dependent variables:   
 Average Yield in excess of Policy Rate 
      Bid-Offer Yield Spread 
      Relative Liquidity 
Independent Variables:  
Lags of Dependent Variables, i.e.,  
Yield over Policy Rate,  
Bid Offer Yield Spread  
Offer Liquidity relative to Bid Liquidity. 
      Lags of News, i.e.,  
Residual terms from equation (1) for MROs, SLTROs and LTROs. 
 
  Dep: AVG_Yield_GCDE  Dep: Spread_GCDE  Dep:Rel Liquidity_GCDE 
Variable  Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff  T-Stat 
Constant     0.754   5.234   0.186   3.147  -0.716  -6.470 
L1AWAYGCDE   0.910  21.639  -0.024  -1.442  -0.017  -0.516 
L2AWAYGCDE  -0.162  -2.881  -0.035  -1.534   0.043   0.950 
L3AWAYGCDE  -0.025  -0.568   0.001   0.082  -0.034  -0.978 
L1SYNGCDE   -0.563  -4.715   0.914  18.668   0.114   1.250 
L2SYNGCDE    0.134   0.878  -0.179  -2.858   0.233   1.998 
L3SYNGCDE   -0.108  -0.849   0.072   1.384  -0.128  -1.321 
L1LIQGCDE    0.101   1.717  -0.009  -0.371   0.243   5.336 
L2LIQGCDE    0.015   0.254   0.008   0.338   0.112   2.396 
L3LIQGCDE    0.087   1.464  -0.003  -0.150   0.107   2.316 
L1NEWSMRO  -0.555  -1.968**   0.774   6.689***  -0.203  -0.899 
L2NEWSMRO   0.673   2.025**  -0.112  -0.825   0.048   0.195 
L3NEWSMRO  -0.465  -1.384  -0.073  -0.530   0.053   0.211 
L4NEWSMRO  -0.116  -0.352   0.026   0.195   0.373   1.497 
L5NEWSMRO   0.222   0.723  -0.025  -0.202   0.012   0.055 
L1NEWSSL   0.245   1.046   0.103   1.077   0.129   0.740 
L2NEWSSL    0.192   0.811   0.330   3.410***   0.353   2.011** 
L3NEWSSL    0.533   2.235**   0.158   1.622   0.028   0.156 
L4NEWSSL    0.114   0.458  -0.334  -3.259***  -0.088  -0.469 
L5NEWSSL    0.251   0.994  -0.451  -4.345***  -0.196  -1.031 
             
R_Bar_Sq  0.669    0.602    0.140   
DW  1.974    1.930    1.940   
             
Table 7: Results for regression associated with equation (2).  Variables are as described in the caption to Tables [5 & 6]. 
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Panel A: SUR with cross equation restriction…equality of MRO News coefficients 
  Dep: AVG_Yield_GCDE  Dep: Spread_GCDE  Dep:Rel Liquidity_GCDE 
Variable  Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff  T-Stat 
L1NEWSMRO  -0.432  -2.054**   0.375   4.881***  -0.002  -0.011 
L2NEWSMRO   0.162   0.658   0.041   0.461  -0.444  -2.200** 
L3NEWSMRO  -0.116  -0.459   0.017   0.188   0.236   1.091 
L4NEWSMRO  -0.114  -0.437  -0.024  -0.252   0.302   1.387 
L5NEWSMRO   0.006   0.027  -0.088  -1.051   0.184   0.935 
             
Unrest Log-L   -733.304    -479.748    -937.785   
Restrict Log-L   -741.387    -503.391    -943.916   
Chi-Sq(10)  0.09498    0.0000    0.26803*   
             
Panel B: SUR with cross equation restriction…equality of LTRO News coefficients 
  Dep: AVG_Yield_GCDE  Dep: Spread_GCDE  Dep:Rel Liquidity_GCDE 
Variable  Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff  T-Stat 
L1NEWSSL  0.261  1.494   0.011   0.175   0.202   1.459 
L2NEWSSL   0.266  1.506   0.151   2.342**   0.366   2.472** 
L3NEWSSL   0.512  2.793***   0.051   0.766   0.141   0.959 
L4NEWSSL   0.188  1.039  -0.129  -1.959*   0.098   0.646 
L5NEWSSL   0.374  2.016**  -0.184  -2.734***  -0.141  -0.889 
             
Unrest Log-L   -733.304    -479.748    -937.785   
Restrict Log-L   -740.977    -502.352    -942.766   
Chi-Sq(10)  0.1199    0.0000019    0.44406*   
             
Panel C: SUR with cross equation restriction…equality of MRO & LTRO News coefficients 
  Dep: AVG_Yield_GCDE  Dep: Spread_GCDE  Dep:Rel Liquidity_GCDE 
Variable  Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff  T-Stat 
L1NEWSMRO  -0.436  -2.071**   0.388   4.991***  -0.001  -0.007 
L2NEWSMRO   0.165   0.667   0.032   0.360  -0.451  -2.233** 
L3NEWSMRO  -0.116  -0.460   0.020   0.216   0.238   1.099 
L4NEWSMRO  -0.116  -0.445  -0.011  -0.118   0.299   1.378 
L5NEWSMRO   0.008   0.037  -0.093  -1.099   0.194   0.987 
L1NEWSSL   0.265   1.515   0.014   0.218   0.202   1.461 
L2NEWSSL    0.263   1.486   0.163   2.502**   0.362   2.441** 
L3NEWSSL    0.518   2.816***   0.053   0.793   0.139   0.940 
L4NEWSSL    0.184   1.014  -0.132  -1.976**   0.094   0.617 
L5NEWSSL    0.379   2.035**  -0.193  -2.833**  -0.139  -0.877 
             
Unrest Log-L   -733.304    -479.748    -937.785   
Restrict Log-L   -749.586    -526.275    -948.386   
Chi-Sq(35)  0.03765    0.0000.    0.38545*   
Table 8: SURE regression results associated with equation (2) estimated for countries Germany , Netherlands and 
Belgium (DE, NL & BE).  Equality restrictions are imposed on parameters for news variables across countries.  Panel A 
contains the results for SUR regression with equality restrictions on MRO news parameters.  Panel B involves the results 
for the case of restrictions on the LTRO news variable.  Panel C involves results for restriction on both news variables. 
Variables are as described in the caption to Tables [5 & 6]. 